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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff Richard Ross
to modify a California divorce decree, with a counterclaim
by Carol Ross for judgment as to arrearages in child support and alimony.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried by the Court, sitting without
a jury, commencing on March 3, 1978, and continuing until
March 17, 1978, whereon the matter was concluded.
Subsequent to the trial, the trial court issued
a Memorandum Decision (R. 215-216) wherein it found the
doct.I:ines

of laches, equitable estoppel, and presumably,

release and waiver, not to apply to the case, and granted
judgment against plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim for
the sum of $31,151 as the amount due after deductions for
certain amounts credited and paid by plaintiff.

The Court

also granted judgment in favor of the Utah State Department
of Social Services in the sum of $1,544, for reimbursement
of welfare paid to the defendant.

The trial court eventually

entered an Amended Order dated April 11, 1978, wherein,
after making all deductions, judgment was granted against
the plaintiff in the sum of $24,451 in favor of defendant,
and against plaintiff in the sum of $1,544, in favor of
the Department of Social Services.
At the same trial, the Court modified the California
divorce decree reducing the alimony from $150 to "O" , and
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the child support from $100 per child to $75 per child.
(T.

231-2)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Richard Ross, seeks reversal of the
judgments against him in favor of both Carol Ross and the
Department of Social Services for arrearages in child support and alimony, on the grounds of equitable estoppel,
waiver and release.

In order to economize on space,

plaintiff has also included in this brief his argument
which would normally be presented in the response to the
brief of defendant Carol Ross, who is appealing the modification of the California decree.

Therefore, plaintiff seek

also that the trial court's judgment modifying the Californ
decree be upheld.

iv
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties in this action were originally divorced in California in February, 1971.

The defendant

herein was awarded alimony in the sum of $150 per month
and child support in the sum of $100 per month per child
for each of three minor children whose ages at that time
were 6, 9 and 10.
was the plaintiff.

In that action, the defendant herein
Prior to trial in this matter in Utah,

the parties stipulated that the California divorce decree
should be adopted by this Court.

(R. 37-8)

1

At the time of the California divorce, the
plaintiff was employed as a mechanic and making approximately $1,000 per month.

(T. 190) 2

His wife, Carol Ross,

was awarded the California home which she sold sixteen
months later for a $25,000 profit.

(T. 215)

Mr. Ross was

not represented by counsel at that California proceeding.
(T. 155)
The plaintiff frankly and honestly testified that
immediately after the California proceeding, he left the
state of California for Dallas, Texas, where he began living
under an assumed name (Henderson) .

He candidly stated his

reasons as wanting to avoid making the payments under the
1 The record, aside from the transcript of the trial, will
be designated by "R.", and the numbering refers to the stamped
number on the lower right.
2 The transcript will be designated by "T.", and the
numbering will refer to the typed number on the upper, right
hand side of the page.
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divorce decree because he couldn't afford them and didn't
want to go to jail.

(T. 10, 155)

justify this action at trial.

He made no attempt to

(T. 10, 155)

Plaintiff nonetheless evinced a genuine concern
for the welfare of the children since he called his mother,
Mrs. Mary McKendrick, who lived near the children, immediately upon his arrival in Texas and inquired about their
welfare.

(T. 82-3, 153-4)

Both the plaintiff, and his

mother, who flew in from California, testified that in these
conversations that occurred in the days immediately after he
left California, plaintiff stated that he would send between
$200 and $250 per month for the support of the children by
means of a check to Mrs. McKendrick.

Mrs. McKendrick was

thereupon instructed to purchase clothing, food, etc. for
the children and take it to them diretly.

(T. 83-4, 12,

153-5)
Mrs. McKendrick affirmed that she did receive on
the average of $200 to $225 per month and that she did spend
the same, every dollar of it, for the welfare of the children.
(T. 83, 85, 90)

Mrs. McKendrick further indicated that a

number of the checks came from Mr. Ross' roommate and some
came by way of money orders because Mr. Ross had not yet
become established in the new town.

(T. 88)

As further

evidence of concern for the family, he instructed Mrs. McKendrick to deliver to Carol an automobile for her use
(T. 89), which she admitted receiving and using.

(T. 61)

Defendant first claimed not to have had contact
again with the plaintiff until February, 1973 (T. 34), but
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later admitted under cross-examination that plainti!! called
her as early as October, 1972.

(T. 59)

Prior to thai;.,

carol had made efforts to locate the plaintiff by going to
the district attorney's office in California to seek legal
action against plaintiff.

(Ex. 25, letter of 11/20/72 from

the Department of Welfare, San Mateo County, Cal.)

Mr. Zambos,

a special investigator for the Department of Recovery Services,
also testified that the defendant went on welfare in Salt
Lake City in October, 1972, and that from that time, through
approximately September, 1973, his department was looking
for the plaintiff to enforce his support obligations.

(T. 102-

108)
Although Carol first claimed not to have
heard from plaintiff or discussed child support with him,
until February 18, 1973 (T. 34, 62), she later admitted
that he called her in January, 1973, and told her of his
desire to "make some arrangements for it (child support)".
(T.

63)
Both plaintiff and defendant testified that

plaintiff flew to Salt Lake City in February, 1973, rented
a car, and lived in a motel, for approximately three days,
during which time he saw the children and the defendant on
several occasions.

(T.

65-7; 160-1)

Beginning in March, 1973, defendant Carol Ross
received support money directly from plaintiff by way of
checks.

(T. 35, 7 O; Ex. 13)

Plaintiff could account for

approximately $310 for a period of roughly six months.
(Ex. 2, schedule B)

The checks contained plaintiff's
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Texas address, phone number and alias name.

(Ex. 13)

In October, 1972, defendant went on welfare in
Salt Lake City, Utah.

(T. 68)

She executed an "assignment"

which assigned to the Division of Family Services " . . . all
monies payable to me.
130; Ex. 4)

.

. from Richard Ross".

(T. 68-9,

Despite the assignment, defendant accepted $310

directly from Mr. Ross during the period from March through
September, 1973

(T. 72), none of which defendant ever reported

(T. 73-5)

to welfare.

Plaintiff testified that the parties had an
understanding between themselves to the effect that he would
only have to pay child support and he could forget the alimony and arrearage in child support.
172)

(T. 17, 19, 159, 161,

Defendant denied such an agreement or understanding.

(T. 65-8, 62)

(But see T. 136, lns. 23-5)

At least as early as March, 1973, defendant knew
plaintiff's exact address and the alias he was using since
he began sending her checks with his return address on them.
(T. 35, 70 and Exs. 13; 2, schedule B)
made any effort, at

Defendant never

any time, to notify Recovery Services,

welfare, or any other officials of plaintiff's whereabouts
(T. 131-2), nor did she attempt to force him to pay any back
child support during this period.

(T. 134-5, 63-4, 71)

The Divison of Recovery Services did institute
a legal proceeding in November, 1973, in Utah against the
plaintiff in Texas, but said proceeding was later dropped
prior to service (apparently after the Attorney General
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discovered the settlement) .

(T. 113 and Ex. 20)

1as totally unaware that said action was filed.

Defendant
(T.

130)

The October, 1972, "assignment", wherein Carol
transferred to the Division of Family Services all monies
payable from the plaintiff, also authorized the compromising
of any and all claims without further notice to herself.
(T. 68-9, 130 and Ex. 4)
Plaintiff himself later initiated contact with
Recovery Services, without ever having been contacted or
found by them, in approximately July, 1973, through a Dallas
attorney.

(T. 27-30; Exs. 17-19)

Plaintiff later called

Mr. Zambos personally and alleged to have arrived at an
agreement whereby certain amounts would be paid every month
and the arrearage would be compromised.
Ex. 16)

(T. 30, 161-4 and

This was disputed by Mr. Zambos.

(T. 115-6, 152)

After the alleged agreement, plaintiff made
regular payments to the Family Support Division as follows
(T. 27-30 and Ex. 15):
a.

Two checks dated August 4, 1973,

and September 17, 1973, for $232 each for a
total of:
b.

$

650.00

Checks to Recovery Services,

1974:

$2,475.00
d.

1975:

464.00

Payments for the balance of

1973 to Recovery Services by check:
c.

$

Checks to Recovery Services,

$2,700.00

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-5Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

e.

Checks to Recovery Services,

January, 1976:

$

Total:

225.00

$6,514.00

In December, 1975, plaintiff visited Salt Lake
City at the request of the defendant (T. 167-8, 20), and
was at that time asked by defendant to return to Salt

Lake

City so that the children could have a father and a family.
(T. 167-8)

Plaintiff thereupon returned to Dallas, Texas,

quit his job and incurred substantial detriment in moving
all of his belongings to Salt Lake City.

(T. 169-70)

Plaintiff and defendant began living together
as man and wife in January or February, 1976, although they
did not remarry.

(T. 168, 142-3)

They lived together at

the home of defendant's parents until approximately September,
1976, at which time they purchased a house as "joint tenants,
husband and wife".

(T. 169-70, 144-5 and Exs. 32-34)

During this period when they were together,
the plaintiff paid substantial sums for the support of the
children and the defendant, as well as a $5,000 downpayrnent
on the home the parties purchased in September, 1976.
(T. 173-6, Ex. 2, schedules C-G)

Plaintiff has paid the

house payment of approximately $365 per month every month
beginning September, 1976, through December, 1977.
5)

(T. 144-

The defendant and the three children have lived in said

house since September, 1976, and at all relevant times
during this action.

(T.

144-5)

During all relevant times from February, 1971,
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th" ''wJh trial, defendant was a good mother,

the children

were well cared for, and suffered absolutely no want,
hardship or privation.

(T. 55, 96)

During the period from February, 1971, through
the time when this legal action was filed, defendant never
made any attempt whatsoever, or filed any claim, to collect
alleged arrearages in child support and alimony.
63-4, 71, 130-2)

(T.

134-5,

Her counterclaim in this action alleging

the arrearages was filed after she was served with the
process in this action, as well as a separate suit for
quiet title to the home.

(T. 182)
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POINT I
THE DOCTRINES OF EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL AND LACHES BOTH APPLY TO BAR THE DEFENDANT HEREIN FROM CLAIMING ARREARAGES
IN CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY.
THE COURT MISUNDERSTOOD AND
MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN THIS
REGARD; THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY
PREPONDERATES AGAINST THE
FINDINGS MADE TO THE EFFECT
THAT SAID DOCTRINES DO NOT
APPLY; AND THIS HAS RESULTED
IN SERIOUS INEQUITY AND A
CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
A
THE LAW OF THIS CASE
Standard on Appeal
This Court has held that divorce actions are equity
proceedings and this Court may review the evidence and make
its own findings.
2d 867

Barker v. Dunham, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P.

(1959); Article VIII §9, Utah Constitution.

However,

the Supreme Court will not exercise this authority as a
general rule since the trial court has considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of
the parties.

However, where the trial court has either mis-

understood or misapplied the law resulting in substantial
and prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly preponderates
against the findings made; or a serious inequity has

result~

as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion, this Court will
step in and reverse where appropriate.

Hansen v. Hansen,

537 P. 2d 491 (Utah 1975); Owen v. Owen, 579 P. 2d 911
(Utah 1978).

Plaintiff-Appellant makes all three contentions

as grounds for reversal of the trial court's decision herein.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by the Utah State Library.
-8Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Estoppel Was Clearly Justified in This Case
Defendant, due to explicit and/or implicit
actions or representations, should be estopped from
claiming or being awarded arrearages in child support and
alimony.

This Court has defined the standard in such cases:
It is the prerogative of the trial
ccurt to determine these facts and
if he finds that facts exist to
justify equitable estoppel, he should
apply the doctrine and relieve the
father of payment of the installments
to the extent indicated. Larsen v.
Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 P. 2d 596
at 598 (1956).
The Trial Court's Findings
The trial court specifically found in its Merner-

andum Decision (R. 215) and its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Findings Nos. 7, 8 and 9, and Conclusions
of Law No. 8, R. 225-7) that the doctrines of equitable
estoppel, laches and waiver did not apply to the
facts of this case.

The trial court thus granted judgment

against plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim for arrear ages
in child support and alimony in the sum of $24,457

(after

deducting $5,000 for the downpayment on the house) as well
as $1,544 against the plaintiff in favor of the Utah State
Department of Social Services for welfare assistance paid
to the defendant.

~.

229)

This judgment is erroneous

under the standards of Hansen and Owens, supra, and should be
reversed.
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The Standard of Larsen v. Larsen
Utah has recognized the principle of equitable
estoppel and related doctrines to bar a mother from collecti
a large, cumulative debt for arrear ages in child support and
alimony.

In Larsen, the father responded to the mother's

claim for arrearages in child support and alimony by allegin
that the mother had refused to accept payments; that a third
party was helping to support the child; that all the mother
asked the father to do was refrain from seeing her and the
child; and that the father had undertaken additional obligations in reliance upon the alleged agreement with, or
actions of, the mother.

The mother admitted that she had not

tried to collect any of the back payments over a period of
eight years.
The trial court ruled that equitable estoppel
was not available as a defense for non-payment of accrued
support for a minor child and the father appealed.
2d at 597.

300 P.

The Supreme Court reversed noting that there

was sufficient evidence that the trial court could reasonabl:
find laches, acquiescense, or equitable estoppel.

Id.

The Court carefully distinguished between a claim that the
alleged agreement or actions of the mother barred her recovery of past or accrued amounts, as opposed to a claim
wherein the alleged agreement or actions were used as the
basis for seeking a modification which would be binding for
future payments. In this conjunction, the Court held:
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However, this does not mean that a
mother may not by her actions or representations, or both, preclude herself
from recovering past-due installments
of support money which she has spent for
the support of the child. Where the
father's failure to make such payments
was induced by her representations or
actions and where as a result of such
representations or actions the father
has been lulled into failing to make
such payments and into changing his
position which he would not have done
but for such representations, and as a
result of such failure to pay and change
in his conditions, it will cause him
great hardship and injustice if she is
allowed to enforce the payment of such
back installments, she may be thereby
estopped from enforcing the payment of
such back installments.
(emphasis added)
300 P. 2d 597.
Justice Crockett emphasized in Baggs v. Anderson,
528 P. 2d 141 (Utah 1974) that support money falls into
two separate categories:
First, the current and ongoing right
of a child to receive support money
from his father (parent); and second,
the right to receive reimbursement
for support of a child after that has
been done.
Id. at 143.
In the second instance, an estoppel to collect
arrearages in support may arise where this essential element is found:

some conduct on the part of the mother

which reasonably induces the obliger to rely thereon and
make some substantial change in his position to his detriment.

(emphasis added)

528 P. 2d at 143.

See also Clark

v. Chipman, 510 P. 2d 1257 (Kan. 1973)
As to the mother's power to make representations
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or take actions compromising arrearages in child support,
the Court in Larsen noted:
If the child has been the beneficiary of equivalent support
and education so that the mother is
entitled to receive all of said pastdue support money, she should be
free to release, compromise, or waive
that which is hers.
300 P. 2d 597.
The standard of equitable estoppel to collect arrearages
in child support and alimony, as set forth in Larsen,
was reaffirmed in several subsequent Utah cases other than
Baggs.
315

3

In French v. Johnson, 16 Utah 2d 360, 401 P. 2d

(1965) the standard of Larsen was recognized, although

not applied.

The plurality (with one concurring and two

dissenting) felt that the facts simply showed "no representations, either explicit or implicit" by the wife
the husband.

Id. at 315.

to

The facts in French stand in

contradistinction to the facts of the case at the bar
where explicit representations or agreements or implicit
representations (actions and conduct) are claimed.
Furthermore, although there was a dispute in
this Court as to the application of the legal standard to
the facts in French, Justice Crockett's statement in the
dissenting opinion summarizes well the objective in this
type of case:
3A recent Utah case presents some superficial fact
similarities to the case at the bar.
(See Ciraulo v.
Ciraulo, 576 P. 2d 884 (1978). However, in Ciraulo, the
issue of equitable estoppel does not appear to have been
raised. The main issue appears to have been substitution
of benefits.
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Nevertheless, it must be remembered
that the equities are not always all
on one side, and that each situation
should be dealt with on its own facts
and toward the objective which is
fundamental to all such proceedings,
that of best serving the welfare of
all concerned. When viewed in that
light, the circumstances may well be
such as to justify the Court invoking
its equitable power and refusing to
enforce immediate collection of a
large accumulated debt.
401 P. 2d
at 317.
See also Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P. 2d 895 (Utah 1976).
The facts of the case at the bar compel the
finding that the conduct of the defendant is such as to
reasonably induce plaintiff to rely thereon and make some
substantial change in his position.
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B

REPRESENTATIONS AND IMPLICIT
AGREEMENT OR CONDUCT JUSTIFYING
RELIANCE
The Preponderance Of The Evidence
Showed At Least Implicit Representations
And Conduct By Defendant Which Compel The
Finding Of Equitable Estoppel As To The
Claims For Arrearages Of Both Child Support And Alimony
It is conceded that plaintiff was wrong in
leaving defendant with three children in California after
the divorce.

(T. 10, 155) 4

Appellant asks this Court

simply to look at all the facts and circumstances which
took place thereafter and which were ignored by the trial
court.

These facts point either to an implicit agreement

or understanding based upon defendant's or her agent's
representations or conduct, which justified plaintiff in
taking action to his detriment, all of which form the basis
for estoppel
Mr. Ross' Agreement With Mrs. Ross

Mr. Ross stated that Mrs. Ross made representation
to him as early as October, 1972, to the effect that she
would not consider him liable to pay the full amount under
the divorce decree if he would simply start paying support
for the children.

(T. 15-17, 159)

Mr. Ross further claimed

4 It is also noted, however, that plaintiff had no
attorney at the California hearing at which he was ordered
to pay $450 a month total on an income of approximately
$1,000 per month, and in which defendant was given the
entire equity in the family home which she later sold for
a $25,000 profit.
(T. 215)
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to have had similar conversations in January, 1973, Febru~1

l97 3, summer and fall of 1973, December, 1975, January,

1976, and at various times thereafter.
164-5, 172)

(T. 19, 159, 160-1,

Regarding the October, 1972, conversation,

Mr. Ross testified as follows:
I don't remember the exact conversation,
but we had talked, and I told her I
wanted to see the kids. And she said,
you know, she wouldn't push anything as
long as I paid support, and it would be
all right for me to come up there (Salt
Lake City) and see the kids ... this is
all she really wanted is for me to take
care of the kids.
I told her I didn't
mind doing this.
(T. 17)
Regarding the February, 1973, conversations, Mr. Ross
testified:
There is no way I can remember the exact
words.
The gist of the conversation was
I would assume responsibility for taking
care of the kids and she wouldn't hassle
me on alimony.
(T. 161)
Regarding conversations in July, August, and September,
1973, the substance thereof was basically the same as the
above two conversations.

(T. 164-5)

All of the relevant

facts and actions of the defendant lend credence to the
testimony of Mr. Ross and cast that of Mrs. Ross in doubt.
Mrs. Ross' Inconsistent
Testimony Regarding These Conversations
On direct examination by her own attorney, Mrs. Ross
was very definite about the fact that after the California
divorce in February, 1971, she next heard from Mr. Ross
in February, 1973.

(T. 34)

She further stated under

direct examination by her own attorney the following:
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Q:

A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

From the time of the divorce, carol,
which is February, 1971, up through
the period when he actually started
living in your parents' home, which
is January of 1976, what if anything
was ever said about the back payments of alimony and child support
that he had not paid during that period?
Nothing.
Nothing was ever said about it?
No.
There was nothing said about the back
payments during this Christmas visit
or at any other time?
No.
(T. 48)

On another occasion, defendant Carol Ross testified as
follows:
Q:

A:

(Mr. Williams):
In fact, you have
already testified here today, haven't
you, that you never did have a conversation about back payments with
the plaintiff until you were living
together (January, 1976)? Isn't that
true?
Yes.
(T. 152)

Under cross-examination, defendant had to admit
that these statements were not correct or fully truthful.
First, she admitted that Mr. Ross made contact with her as
early as October, 1972, instead of February, 1973, as
previously testified.

(T. 34, 59, 62)

Then, she later

testified that she remembered yet another conversation in
January, 1973, wherein he called her and discussed child
support:
Q:
A:

(Mr. Sykes): What did you talk about?
He wanted to come up here and see the
kids for a few days and make some kind
of arrangements for child support and
straighten his name out. That was the
purpose of the visit.

Q:

He indicated to you a desire to pay
child supoort and get that straightened
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A:

around, is that right?
He wanted to make some arrangements
for it, yes.
(emphasis added)
(T. 63)

Mrs. Ross further testified that when Mr. Ross
visited her and the children in February, 1973, the subject
of child support and alimony came up, with the topic centering
around how much he was going to pay.

(T.

67)

The Court definitely had a conflict in the evidence before it, but this certainly

should have been resolved

in plaintiff's favor where defendant's testimony was so
glaringly inconsistent.

Furthermore, it is highly unlikely

that Mr. Ross would come a thousand miles from Texas to discuss child support and not even broach the subject of pastdue payments.

He re-established contact in at least Octo-

ber, January and February of 1972-3, and actually made a
trip to Salt Lake City.
in March. 1973.

(T.

35)

He began paying some support money
It only makes sense that an

implicit understanding was reached.
Mrs. Ross Made No Effort To
Report Mr. Ross To Recovery Services
Or: To Compel Him To Pay Child Support
If there was no understanding or agreement regarding past-due and future child support, as alleged by
Mrs. Ross, then it stands to reason that she would make
every effort to let the authorities know where Mr. Ross was
in order to make him pay child support.

On the other hand,

if the parties did have an understanding that Mr. Ross could
forget past-due child support and delinquent alimony, as
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was his testimony, one would expect Mrs. Ross to take no
such action against Mr. Ross even though she knew his where
abouts.
Mrs. Ross attempted to adopt the former position
at trial by indicating that she was extremely angry with
Mr. Ross in 1972 because of his failure to pay child support.

(T. 127, 143, 152)

But again, the evidence does

not bear out defendant's truthfulness in this regard.

The

evidence clearly supports the inference that there was some
type of understanding between the parties in accordance
with plaintiff's testimony.
The February, 1973

Visit

There is no dispute about the fact that the
plaintiff came to Salt Lake to visit the children during
the period from February 16th through February 18th, 1973.
(T. 63-7)

She knew where he was staying and they visited

together several times.

(T. 6 5- 7)

During this time she

could have easily had him picked up or served with an
Order to Show Cause, had she wanted.
Never Reported Mr. Ross To Recovery Services
It is significant to note that Mrs. Ross went
on welfare in Salt Lake City in October, 1972.

(T. 68)

She was well aware that the "welfare people" could have
made Mr. Ross pay something for child support.

(T. 70)

She even attempted to get the district attorney in San
Mateo County to take some action against Mr. Ross in the
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~arly

lhej

T.

part of 1972, prior to the time that Mr. RGss says
came to an understanding.

(Ex. 25, letter of 11/20/72;

130)

She further admitted that ahe knew that Recovery
Services was looking for Mr. Ross after she went on welfare.

(T.

131-2)

Her story is all the more unbelievable after
March, 1973, because at that time, she began receiving
checks from Mr. Ross, who was living in Texas under his
alias name.

(T. 132, Ex. 13 and Ex. 2 schedule B)

The

checks contained Mr. Ross' name, address and telephone
number.

If she wanted to turn him in, it would have

been simple.
Despite receiving money from Mr. Ross, she never
discussed the matter with Recovery Services (T. 131)
or attempted to report any of the money she received.
(T. 73)

This was so despite the fact that she knew that

welfare prohibited "double-dipping" and required her to
report money received from other sources.

(T.

69-70)

Furthermore, she never reported to Recovery Services
any of her conversations of October, 1972, January 1973,
or thereafter.

(T.

63-4)

Mr. Ted Zambos, a special investigator for
Recovery Services, testified that it was customary to
check with the mother from time to time about the location
of the father when the file comes up for review every 40-60
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days.

(T.

102-105)

He further indicated that he would

have made his first contact with Mrs. Ross in approximately
November, 1972, but his file recorded nothing regarding
any information provided then, or subsequently, by Mrs. Ros!
as to Mr. Ross' whereabouts.
in Ex. 25)

(T. 103; see all of the lette!

Mr. Zambos' file was full of letters indicating

attempts to discover the whereabouts of Mr. Ross through
September, 1973, or a period of at least six months when
Mrs. Ross without question knew his whereabouts!

(T.

107-L

All of this is highly suggestive of the fact
that the parties had an understanding with respect to the
payment of child support, both past and future, and Mrs.
Ross was acting on that agreement in not reporting Mr. Ross.
Mr. Ross' Attorney Contacts Carol Ross
If Carol Ross had any doubt as to Mr. Ross'
whereabouts, or the good faith of his effort to get the
child support problem resolved, it should have been erased

\./hen she received letters from Mr. Ross' attorney in Dallas.
(Exs. 18, 19)
1973.

The letters were dated July 25 and July 27,

Mrs. Ross inexplicably did not remember receiving

said letters.

(T. 134)

The substance of the contact is

set forth in the last paragraph of said letters:
Since it is Mr. Ross' desire to clear up

his past, I am therefore sure you can
understand the procedure he is following
in this matter.
(emphasis added)
(Exs. 18, 19)
There is no evidence that Mrs. Ross ever turned these
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letters into welfare or took any action to report Mr.
Ross at this point.
Mr. Ross Makes Contact With Recovery Services
Mr. Ross testified that he made contact with
Recovery Services for the purpose of getting the matter
of past and future child support and alimony straightened
out.

(T. 27-30, 161-4)

purpose.

He employed an attorney for this

(T. 162 and Exs. 17, 18 and 19)

The first two

checks were paid to Recovery Services on August 4, 1973,
and September 17, 1973.

(Ex. 2 schedule B and Ex. 26,

checks numbered 322 and 359)
reached
Ex. 16)

An agreement was eventually

(the terms of which will be discussed below)

(see

and the plaintiff began making payments directly

to the Family Support clerk.

(See Ex. 15)

But again,

defendant took no effort to press any collections of arrearages allegedly due for child support and alimony.
This is conduct consistent with the position
that the parties had an understanding regarding arrearages:
Mr. Ross would pay child support and Mrs. Ross would not
press any arrearages.
Christmas Visit Of 1975
Both of the parties testified that the plaintiff
visited the children in Salt Lake around Christmastime,
197 5.

(T. 139-40, 165-6)

While here, Mr. Ross stayed

with the defendant at her parents' home, and lived on the
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same floor!

(T. 46, 165-8, 141)

Certainly, if the

defen~
do~

dant had wanted to "get" the plaintiff, she could have
it at that time easily.

Thus, once again, her actions are

more consistent with Mr. Ross' version of the facts:

i.e.

that the parties had an understanding that the back child
support was relinquished.

In fact, Mr. Ross testified

that he was not at all concerned when he came to Salt Lake
at this time, because he was current and the matter of the
past child support had been resolved.

(T. 165-6)

Return To Salt Lake City Permanently
Plaintiff testified that while living at defendant's home during the Christmas season, 1975, they discussed reconciliation and Carol asked him to move to Salt
Lake City and move in with her so that they could raise the
children like a family again.

(T. 167-8)

Carol Ross denies

this version of the story, claiming that they were never
even alone

(!!) during the entire three days.

(T. 140)

Plaintiff's version is obviously more credible since Carol
sent plaintiff a list of car dealers for possible jobs
shortly thereafter

(T. 168, 46), and allowed plaintiff

to move in with her in January, approximately one month
later, and they began living together as man and wife.
(T. 46, 168)
Defendant could have easily had plaintiff taken
into custody or served with an Order to Show Cause in the
event that she was concerned with delinquent support and
alimony payments.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, -22may contain errors.

The Parties' Reconciliation
It is undisputed that the parties lived together
as man and wife from either late January, or early February, through December, 1976, a period of approximately one
year.

Ironically, defendant claimed at trial that she

was still mad about arrearages during this period, but
never did anything:
Q:

A:

Q:

A:

Were you still mad about the fact
that you hadn't received child support and alimony?
(After Mr. Ross
had moved back to Salt Lake and began
living with her)
Itdidn't make me happy.
It was brought
up.
It was brought up? And you said when
you began living together, you still
owe me child support and alimony; pay
up as soon as you can, something to
that effect? Was that it?
No.
(T. 143)

Defendant later testified again that even after they began
living together, she wasn't willing to make any concessions:
How can you forget something like that?
There was a lot of debt.
He owed me a
lot of money.
(T. 152)
Despite this "anger", defendant never took any action to
collect any of the money allegedly owed.

Once again, this

is much more consistent with plaintiff's version of the
facts:

there was an understanding regarding the waiver

of past-due child support and alimony.
The Second Separation
In September, 1976, the parties purchased a
$42,000 home, with plaintiff making a $5,000 downpayment.
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(T. 144-5)

The parties lived there together with their

family until late December, 1976, or a period of approximately three months, at which time they split up again.
(T. 170)

Obviously, at the time that they split up for

t~

second time, feelings toward each other could not have been
the most favorable.

Yet, once again, defendant took no

action whatsoever to attempt to force the payment of any
arrearages.

This again is consistent with the theory of

the arrangement between the parties.
No Protest Or Demand Until Lawsuit Filed
Probably the most convincing argument against
the position taken by defendant and in favor of the estoppel claimed by plaintiff is the fact that defendant
never took any action, made any demand, lodged any protests, or did any other act, to show her dissatisfaction
with the arrangements alleged by plaintiff until plaintiff
filed a lawsuit against her
in December, 1977.

Q:
A:

Q:
A:

Q:
A:

(T. 182) to recover the house

In defendant's own words:

(Mr. Sykes): So you never protested
to anybody in 1973, 1974 or 1975, to
anybody, did you?
No.
Ever?
No.
You never made any objection to anybody?
No.
(T. 134-5)

In fact, if defendant's own testimony is to be believed,
she never even had a conversation (much less, a protest)
with plaintiff himself until they began living together
again in January, 1976.

(T. 152)
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~nlikely

Reasons for Non-Protest

Although she began receiving $225 per month
around August or September, 1973, defendant never protested
to anybody about the past-due support orthe fact that it
wasn't what the Court had originally ordered.
words, she felt that

it

In her own

would be a "hopeless" act (T. 134-

5) because:

the plaintiff was unreliable when he made

arrangements

(T. 129, 71); and she usually got "nothing"

whenever he promised to send her something.

(T.

71)

This statement is hard to square with the fact
that once plaintiff at least thought he had an agreement,
he began paying regular monthly payments and never failed
to make the amount due for 30 months, from August, 1973,
through January, 1976, when the parties moved in together.
(Ex. 15)

Furthermore, he made every house payment without

fail from September, 1976, through December, 1977.
5I

(T.

144-

170)
Either Representations
(An Understanding) Or Conduct Justifying Reliance
Once again, defendant's version of the alleged

unreliability does not square with the actual facts.
Plaintiff's regular, responsible payments of the "agreed"
child support amounts, plus payments of the house payments
which gave defendant and the family a free place to live for
sixteen months, combined with defendant's lack of protest
for nearly 80 months, by her own admission, force the in-
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escapable conclusion that there was an implicit agreement
or understanding between the parties that past-due child
support and alimony was waived or released.

If there was

no implicit agreement, there is certainly conduct which
lulled plaintiff into failing to make payments or seeking
modification.

(T. 169)

Defendant should thus be estopped from claiming
arrearages in this action.
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c
DEFENDANT HAD AN ACTUAL, EXPRESS
AGREEMENT WITH RECOVERY SERVICES,
ACTING ON DEFENDANT'S BEHALF
Initial Contact With Recovery Services
Plaintiff testified that he got somewhat nervous
about making payments directly to defendant, because he
didn't think it was right that she also be on welfare at
the same time.

(T. 27-8)

He thus contacted his lawyer

in Dallas, whose efforts eventually led to plaintiff making
direct payments of $234 each in the months of August and
September, 1973.

(T. 27-8, 162 and Exs. 17-19)

Meanwhile, the efforts of Mr. Zambos to find
the plaintiff were independently coming to fruition and
he did locate the address of Mr. Ross in late September,
1973.

(T. 108)

This apparently led to the telephone call

in which the two talked on October 2, 1973

(T. 109), and

led to Mr. Zambos' letter to Mr. Ross of October 4, 1973.
(Ex. 16)
The "Assignment of Collection Of Support Payments"
On October, 1972, defendant applied for welfare
(T. 75) and executed the "assignment" which reads in
pertinent part as follows:
... I, Carol D. Ross, hereby assign,
transfer and set over to the Utah
State Division of Family Services ...
all monies payable to me and/or my
child from Richard M. Ross ... and also
past support and alimony due me ...
(I] further authorize said assignee
to do every act and thing it deems
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necessary to collect the support
and/or alimony payments, including
any and all legal action it deems
necessary or the compromising of
my or our claims without further
notice to me.
(emphasis added) (Ex. 4)
This document clothed the Department of Social Services
with the express authority to inter alia waive or compromise any claim for arrearages in child support and alimony.
This is so because in the first paragraph, a claim for
"past support and alimony due me" is recognized.

In the

second paragraph of Exhibit 4, the express authority is
given for the "compromising of my or our claims".
This compromise provision makes good sense and
good public policy:

it may often be necessary to compro-

mise all arrearages of both support and alimony in order
to get a repentant, but non-wealthy father to begin paying
in the here and now and ease the State of a welfare burden.
The past due portion is generally impossible to collect
anyway.
This assignment cannot be so narrowly construed as to only grant the authority to waive or compromise the State's portion of money collected (for past welfare payments made) , since it is couched in the language
of "compromising of my or our claims".
the whole sum

"Claims" means

of the arrearage could be given up al-

though the State would only be partially subrogated (to
the extent of welfare payments).
There are absolutely no relevant limitations on
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tl1"

'"uthority granted to the Department of Social Services

in this assignment regarding the compromising of arrearages
in child support.
Mr. Ross' Contact With Mr. Zambos
The contact between plaintiff and Mr. Zambos
of the Department of Social Services has been set forth
above in detail.

(T. 161-5)

Mr. Ross testified that he

initiated the contact with Recovery Services through his
attorney

(T. 162); that he subsequently made a direct tele-

phone call to Recovery Services and talked to someone
who's name he couldn't remember (T. 162); and thereafter
received a letter from that person.

(T. 162-3, Ex. 16)

He further testified with respect to arrearages as follows:

Q:

A:

Q:

A:

Q:
A:
Q:

What did he (Zambos) tell you with
respect to what it meant to make
those payments that you were making,
the $225 a month?
That I would be current, caught up.
And, you know, just continue to pay
it and I would be, you know, out of
trouble.
Did Mr. Zambos say with respect-or was there any conversation at all,
any mention of the past-due payments
that the welfare department had paid?
I had asked if I owed anything from
what I already paid her, and he said,
"No 11 •
That was it?
Yeah.
Otherwise, I could make payments.
Did he say anything about the amounts
accrued prior to the time she went on
welfare?

A:

No.

Q:

But did he say if you make payments in
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A:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:

the future, that was all you have to
make?
Right.
(T. 164)
Do you recall any conversation from
that point on, that totally into
the future $225 would be the only
obligation?
Yes.
Do you have any independent recollection of statements made to
you to that effect?
I asked them about it.
I talked to
them about if I owed them for any
back payments or what the deal was,
how do we work this out.
He said
get caught up from now and pay continually and everything will be
fine.
I was under the impression
that if I stayed in Dallas, or anywhere else in the world, that as long
as I paid this $225, everything was
taken care of.
(T. 30-1)

From this somewhat disjointed testimony, the conclusion
is clear that Mr. Ross is claiming an oral agreement with
Mr. Zarnbos on behalf of Mrs. Ross that plaintiff need not
pay arrearages.

It is only logical that this would have

been on his mind since his previously stated purpose, in
defendant's own words, was to "make some arrangements
for it (child support)".

(T. 63, 27-31, 162)

Mr. Zarnbos' Confirmatory Letter Of
10-4-73 (Ex. 16)
Mr. Ross was justified in the belief that he
had made an agreement with Recovery Services on behalf
of defendant to release the arrearages by virtue of the
letter of 10-4-73.

That letter

(Ex. 16) reaffirmed the

telephone conversation that apparently occurred between
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Zambos and

Mr. Ross on October 2, 1973.

The letter

clearly stated:
... you agreed to pay $75 a month
child support for each child; totaling
$225, effective September 1, 1973;
furthermore, you agreed to double up
on your payments to bring your account
current by October 31, 1973.
(Ex. 16)
Thus, Mr. Zarnbos twice used the word "agreed"
signifying some type of permanent arrangement, which must
have reference to the words "double up ... to bring your
account current ... "

Thus Mr. Ross was fully justified in

believing, as he testified, that his account truly would
be "current", or that he would owe nothing further if
he was to maintain the "agreed" payments.
This is fully consistent with the written,
express grant of authority given to Mr. Zambos in Exhibit
4 wherein he (an agent of the Department of Social Services)
was fully authorized " . . . to do every act and thing . .
necessary or the compromising of my or our claims . .
(as to "past support and alimony due me").

(Ex. 4)

No Independent Recollection
It was not surprising at trial that Mr. Zambos
had no independent recollection of the telephone calls
or facts surrounding the case of Richard Ross
son) or Carol Ross.
(T. 98-9, 114-5)

(aka Hender-

Nor did his file refresh his memory.

He did, however, confirm that his signature

appeared on the letter of 10-4-73 (Ex. 16).

(T.

109)

He

also confirmed what was obvious from the letter:
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Q:

A:

(Mr. Sykes) : I notice in this
first paragraph you use the terminology "at which time you agreed
to pay $75 a month." Then down
in the fourth line you say,
"Furthermore", I am quoting again
from your letter, first paragraph,
"you agreed to double up on your
payments." When you used that
terminology "agreed" were you referring to some arrangement between
yourself and Mr. Ross?
Yes.
(T. llO)

Thus, Mr. Zambos made an agreement with Mr. Ross.
Attempts To Limit Zambos' Authority
Ineffectual--Legal Error Committed By The Court
Despite his lack of independent or refreshed
recollection, Mr. Zambos attempted to "explain" the
unwritten meaning of Exhibit 16 on cross-examination by
his attorney.

This sequence appears in the transcript on

pages 114-117, and 120-121.

The substance of his testi-

many was as follows:
a.

That the letter of 10-4-73 was not
meant to affect the California divorce decree (where Mr. Ross was to
pay $450 per month not $225).
(T.
116, lns. 10, 11)

b.

That Ross was to begin paying $450
a month at the end of October.
(T. 116 , lns. 1 7, 18)

c.

That it was not meant to affect
alimony.
(T. 116, lns. 23-5)

d.

That his "general practice" was
never to enter into an agrement
where a father would pay less than
the divorce decree provided.
(T. 117,
lns. 3-5, 8-9)

e.

That there is some type of "general
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procedure" as to compromise where
arrearages would not be reduced.
(T. 120, lns. 23-30; 121, lns. 1-10)
All of the above testimony was objected to by
plaintiff's counsel, and overruled.

Error was committed

for the following reasons:
a.

It is totally irrelevant and immaterial to the legal affect of
Exhibits 4 and 16 in this case as
to what Mr. Zambos may have done in
other cases for Recovery Services
in the past.
(T. lJ.5, lns. 7, 8)
Mr. Zambos' answer should have been
stricken in that regard.

b.

Mr. Zambos' counsel attempted to lead
him into an improper statement by intimating that Exhibit 16 "refreshed"
his memory, when Zambos had previously
testified that he had no independent
recollection of any of the events on
several occasions.
(T. 115, lns. 21-30)

c.

The Court allowed Mr. Zambos to testify
about what the contents of the letter
of October 4, 1973, "means or meant to
you at the time".
(T. 116, lns. 6-18)
The witness had already testified that
he had no independent recollection and
thus the question was without foundation
and the answer should have been stricken.

d.

The same argument applies to Mr. Williams'
questions about alimony payments in the
letter of 10-4-73 and the way that Mr.
Zambos handles it as a "general principle".
(T. 116, lns. 29-30; 117, lns. 1, 2)

e.

The Judge next allowed defense counsel to
ask a leading question that was also
without foundation about the general practice which would allegedly not permit
Recovery Services to reduce any Court
order.
(T. 116, lns. 3-9)
In addition,
it called for a legal conclusion which
Mr. Zambos was not qualified to make, i.e.
what types of prior agreements between
parties would or would not enable the
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•
parties to pay less than the divorce decree specified.
He cannot
possibly be competent on that subject.
f.

Once again, Mr. Zambos was asked questions
about compromise and what the procedure
has been as to the amounts to compromise.
(T. 120, lns. 23-26)
There were no
foundational questions asked as to where
he derived an understanding of the "procedure".

In general, Mr. Zambos' testimony was highly speculative
as to what might have happened or what could have happened.
(T. 123)

It should have been excluded and it constitutes

an abuse of discretion for the trial court to consider it.
Zambos' Explanations Have No Legal Basis
The attempts of both the other attorneys and

~tr.

Zambos to downplay the importance of the letter of 10-4-73
and the assignment, as well as trying to limit the authoriti
or agency of Mr. Zambos, have no basis in law or fact.

It

is not at all important what Mr. Zambos subjectively thinks
about his authority to compromise claims for past-due
support.

His actual authority is what counts.

His actual

authority is implied (in law) from words, conduct of the
parties, and facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P. 2d 862 (Utah 1978).

Thus, the

agent's own understanding, or misunderstanding, of the
scope of his agency is totally useless.

The facts and

written documentation surrounding this case clearly show
the existence of the agency on the part of the Department
of Recovery Services to compromise claims for arrearage.
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Carol Ross Ratified The Reduction
Of Amounts Allegedly Owed
At one point, defendant Carol Ross under examination by her own attorney attempted to show that she
never made any concessions as to back child support or
alimony.

(T. 152, lns. 18-22)

However, defendant admitted:

a.

That she executed the assignment.

b.

That Recovery Services was working to
obtain child support payments for her
(T. 131-2), as her agent.

c.

That from approximately August, 1973,
through January, 1976, Recovery Services
collected $225 per month, on the average,
from plaintiff on her behalf.
(Ex. 15)

d.

That the plaintiff was acting in reliance
upon said procedure in making payments
to the Family Support Divison.
(Ex. 16)

e.

That she took no steps to modify any
arrangement whereby she was receiving
support payments, or indicate dissatisfaction with the procedure.
(T. 134-5)

(Ex. 4)

The Courts have always held that the alleged unauthorized
agency or act of the agent may be ratified when aff irmance
is accompanied by knowledge of the material facts.

Where

this is the case, a party will be estopped to deny the
agency or authority of the agent.

Fuqua Homes Inc. v.

Grosvenor, 569 P. 2d 854 (Ariz. 1977)
It is clear that defendant and the State must
be estopped from denying the agency of Mr. Zambos in
recovering less than the amount that she was allegedly
due under the California

decree.

Findings of Fact Nos.

7, 8 and 9 are in error and the decision must be reversed.
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D

MR. ROSS HAS BEEN LULLED INTO
FAILURE TO MAKE CHILD SUPPORT
AND ALIMONY PAYMENTS AND IT
WOULD CAUSE HIM GREAT HARDSHIP
AND INJUSTICE IF MRS. ROSS WERE
NOW ALLOWED TO ENFORCE THE PAYMENT OF SUCH BACK INSTALLMENTS
The Larsen Standard
A plaintiff seeking to establish estoppel must
show that the mother's actions lulled him into failing to
make the payments and into changing his position, which he
would not have done but for the representations or the
actions of the mother.

Furthermore, it must be shown that

great hardship and injustice would result i f the mother
was allowed to enforce the payment of back installments.
Larsen, supra.
Detrimental Change of Position

Mr. Ross testified on several occasions about
his detrimental change of position.

(T.

20-1, 23-4, 169-

70, 151; see also Answers to Supplemental Interrogatories,
No. 4, R. l 0 l)
Failure to Seek Modification
Of Divorce Decree
Probably the most important single detriment
to plaintiff sustained in reliance upon the implicit agreement or conduct of defendant was his failure to seek modification of the February, 1971, divorce decree.

Defendant

admitted that she made a substantial amount of money on
the sale of the house in California (T. 215) in approxi-
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m0tccly August, 1972, and that she became employed with

Salt Lake County in approximately July or August, 1973.
Either of these changes in circumstance would have arguably
been grounds for a modification of the 1971 decree.
Plaintiff

had a lawyer in Dallas, with whom

he obviously discussed the entire matter of modification.
(T. 169, Exs. 17, 18 and 19)

In fact, plaintiff testified

as follows:

Q:

A:

Going back to 1973 just for a
moment, did you ever consider
filing an action to modify the
decree during 1973?
I didn't think I needed to. I
thought when I talked with Recovery Services that we had that
all arranged. I just assumed,
you know, everything was taken
care of at this point.
(T. 169)

Coming To Salt Lake In January, 1976
Plaintiff came to Salt Lake City around Christmastime, 1975, to visit the children.

Plaintiff claims

that

defendant asked him at that time to return to Salt Lake
and live with her and the children as a family.

(T.

167-8)

Defendant denies that she made this request at Christmastime
~

140), but the facts speak for themselves.

Plaintiff re-

turned to Salt Lake City permanently in January, 1976,
and moved right in with defendant, sharing the same floor
in the home of defendant's parents.

(T. 141-2)

Plaintiff

claims that they began living together as man and wife almost
immediately, while defendant claims that it wasn't for at
least a month.

(T.

169, 142)
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As a result of the move to Salt Lake City,
plaintiff testified that he sustained the following
specific detriments:
a.

He quit his job in Dallas (T. 169)
wherein he earned approximately
$16,637 in 1975.
(T. 183, Ex. 36)
(Mr. Ross explained why his 1975
tax return did not accurately
reflect his income due to an error) .
(T. 183-4)

b.

He took a lower paying job in Salt
Lake.
(Ex. 11; T. 23, 169)

c.

He had to rent a trailer to haul
his belongings to Salt Lake.
(T. 169)

d.

He had to get a friend to drive one
of his cars up to Salt Lake, presumably
pay his expenses on the road, and buy
a one-way ticket back to Dallas for him.
(T. 169)

e.

He had to sell a boat and trailer that
he couldn't bring to Salt Lake.
(T. 169)

f.

He moved away from many
(T. 20-1)

g.

He (with the defendant) purchased a house
and paid most of the downpayment of
$5, 000 in September, 197 6.
(T. 24, 169-70)
The house is now encumbered in ways that
have led to this lawsuit since the parties
are listed as husband and wife and owners
in "joint tenancy".
(Exs. 32, 33 and 34)

h.

Plaintiff paid a personal judgment of
of the defendant's.
(T. 151 and Ex. 14)

of his friends.

Not insignificantly, it should be emphasized
that at no time did plaintiff ever again seek to file a

modification of the action until December, 1977, when defen
dant refused to leave the home.

(T. 182)

By this time,

thousands of dollars in "arrearages" had accrued.
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Purchase Of The House As A Detriment
It is particularly significant, as a detriment
to plaintiff, that he purchased the house at l084 Grambling
Way.

He testified that he purchased said home with the

defendant as a joint tenant and as "husband and wife" in
September, 1976, with a downpayment of $5,000 that was
almost entirely his.

(T. 169-70, 144-5)

all of the payments on the home.
his home, and his responsibility.

(T. l44)

Mr. Ross made
It was obviously

He testified that he

allowed her to live there, as per agreement when they split
up in December, 1976, through June, 1977, so that the
children could go to school.

(T. 170)

Beca:.use of the fact that both of their names
were legally on the purchase documents for the house,
friction developed between the parties, with the defendant
refusing to remove her name from the house although she
had made no payments whatsoever on it and really had no
valid ownership interest therein.

Plaintiff's filing

of the quiet title and modification action (T. 182)
prompted defendant to file a counterclaim for arrearages
which led to the judgment in this action.
This has caused plaintiff many thousands of dollars in attorney's fees as well as forced sale of the home
and the holding of the money in escrow pending the outcome
of this action.

(R. 238-242)

None of this would have

happened if plaintiff had not justifiably relied on the
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fact that he thought he had an agreement, and thus taken
no action to secure modification or redress for six to
seven years.
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E
THE DEFENDANT-MOTHER MAY BE
ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THE
RIGHT TO RECEIVE REIMBURSEMENT FOR SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
WHEN SAID SUPPORT HAS ALREADY
BEEN PAID
The Legal Standard
When dealing with arrearages for child support
(as opposed to future payments due), the mother has the
right to make a decision releasing the claim for the
amount due.

In Larsen v. Larsen, the Court held:

If the child has been the beneficiary of equivalent support and
education so that the mother is
entitled to receive all of the pastdue support money, she should be
free to release, compromise, or
waive that which is hers. Larsen,
supra at 598.
This is especially true where the support
awarded by the decree has been paid in full or in part
by an out-of-court third party and not by the mother.
In Wasescha v. Wasescha, supra, the Court held that there
is no action for arrearages where the support has been
satisfied by one not claiming reimbursement in Court.
Wasescha, supra at 896.

As the Court pointed out in

Baggs v. Anderson, supra:
This right of reimbursement belongs
to whoever furnished the support;
and it is subject to negotiation,
settlement, satisfaction, or discharge in the same manner as any
other debt.
Baggs, supra at 143.
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Either Defendant Or Her· Parents
Paid The Support
Defendant claimed on several occasions that
either she (T. 152) or her parents (T. 215) paid the
support herein.

If the support was paid by her parents,

her counterclaim must fail since they are not a party
to the action.

releas~

If it was paid by herself, she has

any right to reimbursement for arrearages for the reasons
set forth above.
F

NO CONSIDERATION IS REQUIRED WHERE
PARTIES CHANGE THE MONETARY TERMS
OF A DIVORCE DECREE WITH RESPECT
TO ARREARAGES
This Court has held that the parties may make
agreements changing the monetary terms of a divorce
decree except where future child support is concerned,
absent fraud, hardship, etc.

Wallisv. Wallis, 9 Utah

2d 237, 342 P. 2d 103 at 104 (1959).

Because the

validi~

of such an agreement rests upon equitable estoppel,
laches, etc. and because estoppel sounds in equity, and
not in law, legal consideration is not required.

28 AmJur

2d, Estoppel and Waiver, §30, p. 634.
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POINT II
THE FATHER MAY UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES MAKE CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY
PAYMENTS IN SOME MANNER OTHER THAN
AS DECREED BY THE COURT; IN ANY EVENT,
THE COURT IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS
EQUITABLE DISCRETION IN THIS CASE
SHOULD CREDIT THE FATHER WITH SUCH
PAYMENTS AND FIND SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE DECREE.
A

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT PLAINTIFF HAD MADE CHILD
SUPPORT PAYMENTS TO THE DEFENDANT IN ONLY THE SUM OF $7,024
(FINDING OF FACT NO. 3). THE
COURT ALSO COMMITTED ERROR IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF
IS INDEBTED TO THE DEFENDANT
IN THE SUM OF $16,082 FOR ACCRUED, UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND
$7,675 FOR ACCRUED, UNPAID ALIMONY.
(CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NOS.
4, 6, and 7)
The Applicable Law
The proposition that a father may not unilaterally
decide when, where and how to pay child support and alimony
requires no citation.

This Court has often held that, as a

general rule, alimony and support payments must be made to
the mother and that the decree fixing the obligations of
th2 parties cannot be modified or changed by the conduct of
the parties.

Stanton v.

2d 1010 at 1Cl3
exceptions.

(1974).

Stanto~,

10 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.

However, equity declares certain

The Stanton Court noted that the rule that

a father may not· "unilaterally" decide that he will not pay
support and offset it by favors to the children may be

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-43-OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

modified at times because;
• • . in matters concerning the
custody and support of children,
because of their highly equitable
nature, it is appropriate for the
trial court to take into consideration
the entire circumstances in making
any order of enforcement of the decree, by contempt, or otherwise,
having in mind his equitable powers
to make any adjustment he may think
fair and justified.
517 P. 2d at
1013-4.
This exception would apply all the more where the adjustments made by the father are not "unilateral", but consented to by the mother, as in the case at the bar.
Another Court has stated that although the
husband cannot normally make payments directly to the
children, special considerations of an equitable nature can
justify the Court in crediting such payments on indebtednes£
to the wife when it can be done without injustice to her.
Briggs v. Briggs, 165 P. 2d 772 (Ore. 1946)
Plaintiff Entitled To
Greater Credit On Payment Of Support
This case is not one where the father has simply
refused to make any payments over a long period of time,
totally ignoring the needs of his family.

The Court abused

its discretion in failing to consider this factor.
The Plaintiff and his mother both testified that
plaintiff called his mother within a few days of when he
left California in 1971, inquired about the welfare of the
children, and shortly thereafter began sending $200 to $250
per month to be used for their support.

(T. 10-14; 83-90)
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,Le.~

··1cKendrick testified that every dime of that money was

used for the support of the children.

(T. 90)

This would

have amounted to a total of approximately $4,350.

(Ex. 2,

Schedule A; Ex. 21, IA and IV)
Additionally, plaintiff produced cancelled checks
at the trial for $2,609, which represented money used for
the support of the children during 1976-1977, primarily
dental expenses, clothing, etc.
IE; Ex. 28; T. 155-7)

(Defendant

(Ex. 2, Schedule E; Ex. 21,
did

claim that these

were paid out of a joint checking account, however.

(T. 147))

In addition to expenses that can be segregated
just for the children, plaintiff paid the amounts shown on
Exhibit 2, Schedules C and F (also summarized on Exhibit 21)
which represent general support provided for family expenses
during the time the parties were together.

(T. 155-7)

Schedule G of Exhibit 2, with the exception of the downpayrnent on the house, also represents expenses that are
directly beneficial to the children and the family.
The parties also stipulated that if plaintiff were
to testify, he would affirm that all of the expenses set
forth in Exhibit 21 are amounts which should fairly be considered child support, with the exception of Schedule B
(Ex. 27) which should be considered payment of alimony.
(T. 155-6)

Altogether, in the event that this Court does not
reverse the trial court on the basis of the argument set
forth in POINT I, this Court should reverse at least to the
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..
extent of decreeing that the amounts set forth in plaintifi
Exhibit 21, totalling $28,003.09, should be credited

tot~

account of the plaintiff for the following reasons:
a.

The equitable circumstances of this
case, recited above at length, require
such findings.

b.

The clear preponderance of the evidence,
as recited above, compels the finding
that all of said amounts were paid by
plaintiff and intended by him to be
payment of support obligations; and
were accepted by the defendant as substituted of equal consideration for
the support obligations.

As an example of the latter, see Exhibit 21, II, wherein
house·payments totaling

$5,840 were made by plaintiff, thus

providing defendant and the family with housing at no charg'
for over a year.
B

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ABATE THE ALIMONY
AND CHILD SUPPORT FOUND OWING
FOR THE TIME THAT THE PARTIES
LIVED TOGETHER DURING A RECONCILIATION ATTEMPT
The Legal Standard
Counsel has found no Utah case specifically on
point regarding this issue, but it has often been dealt w~
by other courts.
849

In the case of In Re Peterson,

57 2 P. 2d

(Colo. App. 1977), the parties were divorced in November

1974.

From January through September, 1975, the parties

lived together with the children in the hope of effecting a
reconciliation, as in the case at the bar.

After the father
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, •d out, the mother claimed arrear ages for chilC! support
and alimony.

In upholding a ruling adverse to the mother,

the intermediate Colorado Appellate Court held:
. . . Under the circumstances of this
case, where the parties made a good
faith, although unsuccessful attempt
at reconciliation, and where the husband supported the family at this time,
we agree with the trial court that the
support paid and contributed by the
husband constituted payment of the installments accruing during the period
that they were living together. This
conforms to the public policy in the
state "to promote and foster the marriage relationship and reconciliation
of estranged spouses."
(citation ommitted)
572 P. 2d at 851.
This policy should be adopted in the State of Utah.
The Parties' Reconciliation
The parties lived together in a reconciliation
attempt from January through December, 1976.

(T. 168, 144-5)

In a sense, the reconciliation attempt continued even after
plaintiff moved out of the house in December, 1976, since
he allowed defendant to remain in the home; continued to
provide considerable support; and even delivered a car to
his wife to drive six months after he moved.

(T. 195, 206,

217)
In any event, this Court should reduce the amount
for which judgment was granted by the sum of at least $450
per month for each of the months in which the parties
actually lived together, or from February through December,
1976, or a period of eleven months.

That would result in a

reduction of $4,950.
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POINT III
THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE
IN CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE FINANCIAL
CONDITION OF THE DEFENDANT, AS WELL
AS IN OTHER REGARDS, WHICH JUSTIFIED
THE COURT IN REDUCING THE ALIMONY
AWARD TO 0 AND THE CHILD SUPPORT TO
$75 PER MONTH PER CHILD.5
A

DEFENDANT'S CIRCUMSTANCES HAD
SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED FOR THE
BETTER JUSTIFYING A DECREASE
IN ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT
The Legal Standard
This Court has always held that divorce decrees
may be modified only upon the showing of a substantial
change in circumstances.
198 p. 2d 233

Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216,

(1948) .
Plaintiff's Circumstances
Basically Unchanged

Plaintiff testified that although he was unemploy
for a certain part of 1971, his earning rate was approximately $1,000 per month while working.

Thus, had he been

employed for the entire year, he would have made approxirnat
$12,000.

(T. 197, 190)

He also testified that his income

SAlthough the Court ruled in favor of plaintiff on
the issue of modification, and plaintiff makes no appeal in
this regard, the argument in opposition to defendant's appe'
on this point will be enclosed in this brief in POINT III
in order to save the necessity of filing a reply brief, and
to conserve the time of the Court in this matter.
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time of the trial was approximately $1, 200 per, month

(T. 191), and that his living expenses were approximately
$1,110 to $1,167 per month.
It is clear that there is no 3ubstantial change
in plaintiff's circumstances which would justify an increase
in child support, or further payment of alimony.
Defendant's Circumstances
Defendant testified that at the time of the divorce hearing in California, she was not employed at all and
had no other income from any source other than her father.
(T. 208)
Defendant became employed in approximately May of
1973.

(R.

146)

Her

payroll stubs for November, 1977,

indicated that as of the end of that month, she had made
approximately $8,096, and that by the end of the year she
would make $9,000 for that year.

(T. 209-10)

In addition,

and more importantly, her recent payroll stub for the
period ending 2/28/78 showed that as of that date, for
approximately 1/6 of the year, she had earned the sum of
$2,404.

This would project a yearly income of approximately

$15,004.
defendant.

(T. 226)
(T.

This is a substantial change for

224, 226)

When viewed as a whole, there is little question
that the facts and circumstances surrounding this case
justify the Court's finding that alimony should be reduced
to zero and child support should be reduced to $75 per
month per child.
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CONCLUSION
This is basically a case where actions speak
louder than words.

Plaintiff believes that the facts of

this case, when viewed objectively, show the following:
a.

Plaintiff made a mistake by leaving
California and in a sense abandoning
the family, but even so made some
effort to support his children by
payment of approximately $200 to $250
per month to his mother, who purchased
clothing and food for the family.

b.

The Plaintiff attempted to rectify
his past mistakes by contacting the
defendant, and paying her some money
directly.

c.

He further attempted to rectify his
mistake by contacting Recovery Services
and getting his "name straight" and
arriving at an agreement as to what he
could afford to pay.

d.

Defendant, by her explicit or implicit
representations, as well as by her
conduct, should be estopped from
claiming any arrearages of either child
support or alimony.

e.

Recovery Services, acting as defendant's agent, made an explicit agreement
with the plaintiff, whereby defendant
should also be estopped from claiming
the arrearages.

f.

The facts and circumstances as well
as the conduct of the defendant during
the entire period justify estopping her
from claiming any arrearages in child support and alimony for the main reason
that she failed to take any action whatsoever to collect said arrearages despite
numerous opportunities.
This conduct
supports plaintiff's version of the facts.
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y.

The plaintiff reasonably relied upon
the conduct and/or representations of
the defendant and her agent, Recovery
Services, and subsequently suffered
great detriment, financial and otherwise.

In addition, plaintiff is entitled to a reduction
in the judgment of amounts paid generally for support, even
though they were not paid directly to the mother.

Plaintiff

is also entitled to an abatement on the child support and
alimony during the times that the parties were reconciled
and living together.
All of the facts and circumstances support a
finding of substantially changed circumstances, justifying
the modification of the California decree, as effected
by the trial court.

R;e;t2t?~
~

Robert B. Sykes
Attorney for Plaintiff--Appellant
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